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In this paper an algebraic characterization of consistent assessments in extensive
. form games in the sense of Kreps and Wilson, 1982, Econometrica 50, 863]894 , is
given. As a corollary, we show that consistency can be characterized by so-called
‘‘simple’’ sequences of assessments. The algebraic characterization is used to
develop an algorithm which computes the set of consistent assessments. Moreover,
the geometrical structure of the set of consistent assessments is described: It turns
out to be the intersection of a ﬁnite product of simplices with a ﬁnite number
of logarithmic cones. Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Number: 210.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In an extensive form game, a combination of a behavior strategy proﬁle
and a belief system is called an assessment. Such an assessment is a
. sequential equilibrium Kreps and Wilson, 1982 if it satisﬁes sequential
rationality and consistency. A sequential equilibrium can be viewed as
.  . properly extending Selten’s ideas of subgame perfectness 1965, 1975 .
The ﬁrst condition, sequential rationality, is equivalent to a system of
polynomial inequalities and is therefore straightforward to check. Check-
ing consistency, however, is in general much harder because the deﬁnition
requires sequences of assessments. A formal deﬁnition of consistent as-
sessments is given in Section 2.
. In Section 3 we present the central result of this paper Theorem 3.1 ,
which is a purely algebraic characterization of consistent assessments: It
does not make any use of sequences and limits, but characterizes consis-
tent assessments by two algebraic conditions. The ﬁrst condition is a
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restriction pertaining to the supports of the strategies and beliefs. It turns
out that checking this restriction is equivalent to solving a linear program,
an insight which plays an important role in the algorithm indicated below.
The second condition of the characterization implies that we can put
mistake probabilities on the actions played with probability zero in such a
way that the relative beliefs are equal to the relative realization probabili-
ties of the corresponding nodes. The relationship between relative proba-
bilities and consistency of assessments is also considered in Kohlberg and
.  . Reny 1991 and McLennan 1989a, 1989b . Before stating the proof of
this theorem, we provide an example illustrating how this result can be
used to check whether a given assessment is consistent.
This central result will be applied in several ways. First, as is shown at
the end of Section 3, the proof of Theorem 3.1 can be used to prove that a
consistent assessment can always be approximated by a sequence of
completely mixed assessments of a very simple form, determined by just a
few parameters.
Second, in Section 4, the characterization is used to develop an algo-
rithm which computes the set of consistent assessments in a given exten-
sive form game.
Finally, the characterization makes it possible to give a geometrical
description of the set of consistent assessments in Section 5. As a byprod-
uct of this description, it can be shown rather easily that the set of
consistent assessments is semialgebraic, which means that it can be de-
scribed by a ﬁnite number of polynomial inequalities. Since sequential
rationality is equivalent to a ﬁnite system of polynomial inequalities, it
follows directly that the set of sequential equilibria is semialgebraic, a
. result which has already been shown by Blume and Zame 1994 .
4 . Notation. R* [ R jy ` . For every x g R we deﬁne x qy `[
. . . . y ` . Moreover, y` qy `[ y `whereas y` yy ` is not de-
ﬁned.
. For a ﬁnite set A, D A is the set of all probability distributions on A.
For a matrix M we denote the transposed matrix by M
t.
2. MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
Notation in Extensi¨e Form Games
In an extensive form game, the information sets are denoted by h,
whereas H is the collection of all information sets. By X we denote the
set of all nonterminal nodes. The set of terminal nodes is denoted by Z.A t
. an information set h, Ah is the set of actions available at h. The sets
. .  . Ah should be such that Ah and Ah 9 are disjoint whenever h and h9PEREA Y MONSUWE, JANSEN, AND PETERS ￿ 240
are different. We assume that the extensive form games considered have
. perfect recall see Kuhn, 1953 . A formal description of extensive form
. games can be found in Kreps and Wilson 1982 .
Consistent Assessments
. A beha¨ior strategy proﬁle BSP is a function s which assigns to every
. information set h a probability distribution s on Ah.Abelief system is h
a function b which assigns to every information set h a probability
. distribution b on the nodes in this information set. A combination s, b h
of a BSP and a belief system is called an assessment.
. An assessment s, b is called Bayesian consistent if at every informa-
tion set which is reached with positive probability the beliefs are derived
. according to Bayes’ rule. So for every h with P h ) 0 it must hold that s
P x . s
b xs . h P h . s
. . for every x g h. Here, P x and P h denote the probabilities that the s s
node x and the information set h, respectively, are reached if s is played.
. An assessment s, b is called consistent if there is a sequence
 kk . s , b of completely mixed, Bayesian consistent assessments con- kgN
. verging to s, b . Completely mixed means that every action is played with
positive probability. Obviously, consistency implies Bayesian consistency.
3. CHARACTERIZATION OF CONSISTENT ASSESSMENTS
Before formulating our main result, we need some further deﬁnitions.
. q . For an assessment s, b , A s denotes the set of actions played with
q. positive probability and by X b we mean the set of nodes with positive
q. q belief. The restriction of s on the actions in A s is denoted by s .B y
0. Aswe denote the set of actions played with probability zero whereas
0. Xbdenotes the set of nodes with belief zero.
.  . wx A pseudo-BSP is a system s s s of functions s : Ahª0,1 . hh g Hh
. In contrast with BSP’s, the sum of the probabilities of the actions in Ah
does not need to be equal to 1 in a pseudo-BSP. A pseudo-BSPs is called
completely mixed if every action is played with positive probability.
. . For a pseudo-BSPs, P x and P h are deﬁned in a similar way as for s s
a BSP.
The following theorem gives an algebraic characterization of consistent
assessments. In the theorem, we denote by A the set of actions which x
occur on the path to the node x.CONSISTENT ASSESSMENTS 241
. T HEOREM 3.1. Let G be an extensi¨e form game and s, b be an
. assessment. Then, s, b is consistent if and only if:
.  . 4 . 0 1 there are numbers « a g 0,1 such that ag A s .
« a s « a . . 
00 . . a g As l Aa g A s l A xy
q . for all nodes x, y g X b in the same information set and
« a - « a . . 
00 . . a g As l Aa g A s l A xy
0 . q . for all nodes x, y in the same informationset with x g X b and y g X b ,
and
q . 2 s can be extended to a completely mixed pseudo-BSP s such that
P x b x . . s
s
P y by . . s
q . for all nodes x, y g X b in the same information set.
. Intuitively, condition 1 says that we can put mistake probabilities on
the zero probability actions such that b places positive belief exactly on
those nodes which are reached with maximum mistake probability. There-
 q. q . . fore, this condition checks whether the combination A s , X b is
. possible in a consistent assessment. Condition 2 states that we can put
mistake probabilities on the zero probability actions such that the relative
probabilities of the nodes with positive belief are equal to the relative
beliefs.
. Condition 1 is somewhat related to the notion of a b-labelling, used by
. Kreps and Wilson 1982 in their Lemma A1. Furthermore, there is a
.  bb . connection between condition 2 and the mapping m ,p which can be
found in Lemma A2 of the same paper.
Before proving this theorem, we give an example in order to illustrate
. . the meaning of conditions 1 and 2 in the theorem. Moreover, this
example shows how the characterization can be used to check whether a
given assessment is consistent or not.
EXAMPLE 1. Consider an extensive form game with the extensive form
structure shown in Fig. 1. This extensive form structure is also used by
. Kohlberg and Reny 1991 in their Fig. 5.
1 .  . .  . Consider an assessment s, b with s c s s d s 1, b x s , 1 3
11 . . b ys , and b z s . We apply Theorem 3.1 in order to verify if 11 52
. s , b is consistent.PEREA Y MONSUWE, JANSEN, AND PETERS ￿ 242
FIGURE 1
q We can extend s to a completely mixed pseudo-BSP s by deﬁning
123 6 s a s , s b s , s e s , and s f s . . . . . 331 0 1 0
Obviously, it holds that
P x b x . . s
s
P y by . . s
. for all x, y lying in the same information set. Hence, condition 2 in
Theorem 3.1 is satisﬁed.
. Condition 1 in this theorem is also satisﬁed by choosing
1 « a s « b s « e s « f s . . . . . 2
. Therefore, we may conclude that s, b is consistent.
.  . .  . Now, consider an assessment s, b with s c s s d s 1, b x s 0, 1
12 . . b ys , and b z s . 11 33
. Assume that condition 1 in Theorem 3.1 would be satisﬁed for some
. . . .  .  . «a ,«b ,«cand « d . Since b x s 0 and b x ) 0 it follows that 12
. . . . . . «a- «b . Furthermore, it must hold that « a ? « e s « b ? « f
. . . which implies that « e ) « f . However, this would mean that « a ?
. . . q . « f - « b ? « e which is a contradiction since z , z g X b . Hence, 12
.  . condition 1 can not be satisﬁed. By Theorem 3.1, s, b is not a
consistent assessment.CONSISTENT ASSESSMENTS 243
. Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let s, b be an assessment. For convenience,
q 0 q 0 q. 0 . q . we write A , A , X , and X instead of A s , A s , X b , and
0.  . Xb . For every information set h, let rh be the ﬁrst node in h with
 positive belief. We assume, for convenience, that the nodes in an informa-
. .  . tion set are ordered. For a node x g h, let rx[ rh. We construct the
matrix M as follows. The rows of the matrix correspond with the nodes in
0 . 0 X and the columns with the actions in A ,s oMs m . The x, ax g X , a g A
elements m are given by x, a
1i f a g A and a f A ¡ xr  x . ~ m [ y 1i f a f A and a g A x, a xr  x . ¢
0 otherwise.
. Furthermore, we deﬁne the vector s s s by xx g X
s [ log t c q log s a y log t c . . .   x
q c g Cc g C a g A l A xr  x . x
y log s a . . 
q a g Al A r  x .
. Here, C is the collection of chance moves on the path to x and t c is the x
positive probability that the chance move c occurs.
. Let the vector b s b be given by xx g X
b [ log b x y log b rx , . . . x
. where log0 [ y`. Note that b can be y` since b x can be 0. x
From the deﬁnitions of M, b, and s, it can be shown that an assessment
.  k . A 0
s , b is consistent if and only if there is a sequence w in R kgN
converging coordinatewise to y` such that
b s s q lim Mw




0 be the restrictions of M to the rows corresponding
to nodes in X
q and X
0 respectively and let s
q, b
q be the restrictions of
the vectors s, b to nodes in X
q. In the following lemma, we show that
. condition 3.1 is equivalent to two algebraic conditions.
. L EMMA 3.2. The assessment s, b is consistent if and only if
. q 0 1 there is a ¨ector w - 0 with M w s 0 and M w - 0 and
. qq  q . 2 b g s q Im M .PEREA Y MONSUWE, JANSEN, AND PETERS ￿ 244
. Proof. ‘‘«’’ Assume that s, b is consistent. Then, we can ﬁnd a
 k. sequence w converging coordinatewise to y` such that b s s q kgN
lim Mw
k. Let the vector ¨ be given by ¨ [ b y s and let ¨
q be the kª`
restriction of ¨ to the nodes in X
q. By construction, ¨ g R for all x
x g X
q and ¨ sy ` for all x f X
q. Since lim Mw
k s¨, it follows xk ª `
that the linear system of equations Mxs¨ has an approximate solution,
. 1 in the sense of Kohlberg and Reny 1991 . Now, we can use a remark in
Kohlberg and Reny’s paper, stating that if the system Mxs¨ has an
approximate solution, then the system restricted to the ﬁnite entries of ¨
has a solution in the ‘‘normal’’ sense. In this case, this means that the
qq q q q . system Mx s ¨ has a solution, implying that b g s q Im M .
A0 qq  A 0 0 Now, let z g R with Mz s ¨. Let B [ w g R N w Fy 1, Mw
4 q 4  Fy 1 and C [ Mw N w g B . The inequality w Fy 1 should be read
. coordinatewise. Obviously, B is a closed and convex set. Moreover, B is
nonempty since w
k g B for large k. It follows that C is a nonempty closed
convex set. Suppose that 0 f C. Then, there exists a hyperplane which
4 separates the sets C and 0 strongly. In other words, we can ﬁnd a
nonzero vector p and a number a g R such that p ? c ) a for all c g C
and p ? 0 - a. The last inequality implies that a ) 0. From the ﬁrst
inequality, it follows that p ? M
qw ) a for every w g B. Since w
k y z g B





qz. Therefore 0 G a, which is a contradiction. So kª`
0 g C, which implies that there is a w g R
A0




. . A 0
‘‘¥’’ Let 1 and 2 in Lemma 3.2 be satisﬁed and let z g R with
qq q  k . k b s s q Mz . Deﬁne the sequence w by w [ z q kw. It is easy kgN
 k. to check that w converges coordinatewise to y` and b s s q kgN
k . lim Mw , which implies that s, b is consistent. B kª`
Now, we are able to prove Theorem 3.1.
.  . ‘‘«’’ Let s, b be consistent. By 2 in Lemma 3.2 there is a
0 A qq q z g R such that b s s q Mz . We deﬁne the pseudo-BSP s by
s a if a f A
0 .
sa[ . 0  exp z if a g A . . a
Since
b s s q mz s s q z y z   xx x , aa s a a
00 0 a g Aa g A l Aa g A l A xr  x .
1 A linear system of equations Mxs¨, where ¨ can contain inﬁnities, is said to have an
 k. k approximate solution if there is a sequence x satisfying lim Mx s¨. kgN kª`CONSISTENT ASSESSMENTS 245
for every x g X
q, we obtain by taking the exponential function on both
sides and using the deﬁnitions of b ,¨ , and m that xx x , a
s a . tc? sa  . . 
q 0 b x . c g C a g Al Aa g A l A x xx s ?
b rx tc? sa sa . . . . .  
q 0 c g C a g A l A a g A l A r  x . r  x . r  x .
P x . s
s
P rx . . s
q . for every x g X which implies condition 2 in Theorem 3.1.
Since M
qw s 0 it follows that
w y w s 0  aa
00 a g A l Aa g A l A xr  x .
for every x g X
q. Taking the exponential function on both sides leads to
the equation
exp w  a
0 agA lAx s 1
exp w  a
0 agA lAr x.
for every x g X
q. Since M
0w - 0, we can show in a similar way that
exp w  a
0 agA lAx - 1
exp w  a
0 agA lAr x.
0 . .  . for every x g X . Finally, we deﬁne the constants « a by « a [ exp wa
for every a g A
0.
Since the proof in the other direction is similar, the proof of Theorem
3.1 is complete. B
Consistency and Simple Sequences of Assessments
As a corollary of Theorem 3.1, we show that we can restrict ourselves to
a very special class of sequences of completely mixed assessments if we
want to check whether a given assessment is consistent or not. These
sequences, which we call simple, have the property that they are com-
pletely determined by assigning two parameters to every action. As a
consequence, the inﬁnitely dimensional problem of checking consistency is
reduced to a ﬁnitely dimensional problem.PEREA Y MONSUWE, JANSEN, AND PETERS ￿ 246
 kk . A sequence s , b of assessments is called simple if for every kgN
. .  x action a there are numbers s a ) 0 and « a g 0,1 such that
k kk s a s Rh ? s a ? « a . . . . .
. k . for every k g N. Here, h is the information set with a g Ah and Rh
kk y 1 . w . . . x is the normalizing constant given by Rh s  s a 9?«a 9 . a 9 g A  h .
. C OROLLARY 3.3. An assessment s, b is consistent if and only if there is
 kk . a simple sequence s , b of completely mixed, Bayesian consistent assess-
. ments con¨erging to s, b .
Proof. We only have to prove the ‘‘only if’’ part, since the ‘‘if’’ part is
. true by deﬁnition. Let s, b be a consistent assessment. By Theorem 3.1
0 . .  . we can ﬁnd numbers « a and s a for every a g A s such that the
. . q . conditions 1 and 2 in this theorem are satisﬁed. For every a g A s
kk . . .  . we deﬁne s a [ s a and « a [ 1. Since the simple sequence s , b
of completely mixed, Bayesian consistent assessments induced by these
. numbers converges to s, b the proof is complete. B
The notion of simple sequences of assessments is somewhat related to
. the sequences used by Kreps and Wilson 1982 in the proof of Lemma A2.
However, the sequences in Kreps and Wilson are constructed in a differ-
ent way.
4. AN ALGORITHM
In this section we provide an algorithm to compute the set of consistent
assessments in an extensive form game. First, we introduce some further
notation and discuss several lemmas which play an essential role in the
development of the algorithm.
In an extensive form game G, we denote the set of consistent assess-
c qq c  qq . ments by A A . For given sets A and X , A A A , X denotes the set of
. q . qq . q consistent assessments s, b with A s s A and X b s X . Obvi-
ously,
A A
c s A A
c A
q, X
q . . D
qq A , X
. In the proof of Theorem 3.1 we constructed for a given assessment s, b
q. q . a matrix M. However, this matrix depends on the sets A s and X b
only. This means that we can construct such a matrix M for every possible
combination A
q, X
q. Furthermore, we introduced for a given assessment
. s , b the vectors b and s, where b depends on b and s depends on s.CONSISTENT ASSESSMENTS 247
. . Therefore, we denote these vectors by b b and s s respectively. By
q. q . . . q b band s s we denote restrictions of b b and s s to X .
. From Lemma 3.2 it follows that an assessment s, b can only be
consistent if there is a vector w - 0 with M
qw s 0 and M
0w - 0.
Obviously, this problem is equivalent to the problem ‘‘Is there a vector
w Fy 1 with M
qw s 0 and M
0w Fy 1?’’.
2 The latter problem is an LP
 problem and can therefore be solved efﬁciently by using the simplex
. method, for example . Combining this insight with Lemma 3.2 leads to the
following lemma, which turns out to be the keystone for our algorithm.
LEMMA 4.1. Let A
q, X
q be gi¨en and M be the corresponding matrix.
If there is a ¨ector w Fy 1 with M
qw s 0 and M
0w Fy 1 then
c qq . . q . A AA , X is equal to the set of assessments s, b with A s s
qq . qq . q . q . A , X b s X , and b b g s s q Im M .
c qq . Otherwise, A A A , X is empty.
The proof follows directly from Lemma 3.2.
 q.t. LEMMA 4.2. There is a basis for Ker M which consists of integer
¨ectors.
 q.t  q.t Proof. Since M is an integer matrix, we can transform M with
the Gauss-elimination method into a rational upper-triangular matrix.
 Obviously, the kernel of this triangular matrix and, hence, the kernel of
 q.t. M has a basis consisting of rational vectors. By multiplying these
vectors with an appropriate integer, we obtain a basis consisting of integer
vectors. B
1 r  q.t. LEMMA 4.3. Let n ,...,n be a basis for Ker M consisting of integer
¨ectors. Then,
Im M
q s z N n
i ? z s 0 for i s 1,...,r . 4 .
The proof of this lemma is straightforward.
q. q . From Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.3 it follows that b b y s s g
 q. i q. i q . Im M if and only if n ? b b s n ? s s for all i. This result leads to
the following corollary.
1 r  q.t. COROLLARY 4.4. Let n ,...,n be a basis for Ker M . If there is a
q 0 c qq . ¨ ector w Fy 1with M w s 0 and M w Fy 1 then A A A , X is equal
. q . qq . q to the set of assessments s, b with A s s A , X b s X , and
n
i ? b
q b s n
i ? s
q s for all i. . .
c  qq . Otherwise, A A A , X is empty.
2The inequalities w Fy 1 and M 0w Fy 1 should be read coordinatewise.PEREA Y MONSUWE, JANSEN, AND PETERS ￿ 248
Now, we are able to construct an algorithm which generates the set of
consistent assessments. The algorithm is based on the following steps.
Step 1. Choose A
q, X
q and compute the corresponding matrix M.
Step 2. Solve the LP-problem ‘‘Is there a vector w Fy 1 with M
qw
s 0 and M
0w Fy 1?’’ with the simplex method.
If the answer is ‘‘yes,’’ then go to step 3.
c qq . If the answer is ‘‘no,’’ then A A A , X is empty and go to Step 1 until
qq . every combination A , X has been chosen .
1 r  q.t. Step 3. Compute a basis n ,...,n for Ker M consisting of
c qq . integer vectors with the Gauss-elimination method. Then A A A , X is
. q . qq . q equal to the set of assessments s, b with A s s A , X b s X
i q. i q . and n ? b b s n ? s s for all i.
 qq . Go to Step 1 until every combination A , X has been chosen .
If we translate the linear equations in Step 3 into the original strategies
s and the original beliefs b by taking the exponential function on both
sides, we obtain a system of polynomial equations in s and b. A different
algorithm to compute such polynomial equations can be found in Kohlberg
. and Reny 1991 .
In the following example, we apply the algorithm in order to compute
c qq . one particular set A A A , X for the extensive form game of Example 1.
EXAMPLE 2. Let G be an extensive form game with the extensive form
structure of Fig. 1.
q 4 q 4 Step 1. Choose A s c, d, g, h, i, j and X s x , x , y , y , z , z . 121212
0 4 0 . Hence, A s a, b, e, f and X is empty. The nodes rxare given by
rx s rx s x , ry s ry s y , rz s rz s z . . . . . . . 12 1 12 1 12 1
The corresponding matrix M is given by
ab e f
x 0 000 1
x y 1 100 2
y 0 000 1 M s . y y 11y 11 2
z 0 000 1
z y 11 1y 1 2
Step 2. Since X
qs X, we have that M
qs M and M
0 s B. There is a
q  w vector w Fy 1 with Mw s 0. Take, for example, w sy 1, y1, y1,
x . y1.CONSISTENT ASSESSMENTS 249
 q.t. Step 3. The transposed matrix M is given by
0 y10y 10y 1
t 01 01 01 q M s . .
00 0 y 10 1
00 01 0 y 1
By Gauss-elimination, this matrix can be transformed to the upper-triangu-
lar matrix
0 y10y 10y 1
00 0 y 10 1 .
00 00 00
00 00 00
Therefore, the integer vectors n
1, n
2, and n
3 are given by
1 wx 2 wx 3 wx n [ 1,y2,0,1,0,1 , n [ 0,y2,1,1,0,1 , n [ 0,y2,0,1,1,1
 q.t. form a basis for Ker M .
. For every assessment s, b we have by deﬁnition
b
q b s log b x y log b rx  . . . . x
and
s
q s s log s a y log s a .  .  .  x
qq a g A l Aa g A l A xr  x .
q . q . 4 for every x g X. Hence, b b s s s s 0i f x gx,y,z . There- xx 111
i q . i q . fore, the equations n ? b b s n ? s s are all equivalent to the equa-
1 q. 1 q . tion n ? b b s n ? s s . This equation is given by
y2 log b x y log b x q 1 log b y y log b y . . . . . . 21 21
q 1 log b z y log b z s 0 . . . 21
q . since s s s 0 for all x g X. If we take the exponential function on both x
sides, we obtain the equation
y2 b x b y b z . .. 22 2
s 1 y 2 b y b z . . b x . 11 1
which is equivalent to
22 b x b y b z s b x b y b z . .. . .. . 12 2 21 1PEREA Y MONSUWE, JANSEN, AND PETERS ￿ 250
c qq . Finally, we may conclude that A A A , X is the set of assessments
. q . qq . q s , bwith A s s A , X b s X , and
22 b x b y b z s b x b y b z . .. . .. . 12 2 21 1
5. STRUCTURE OF THE SET OF CONSISTENT
ASSESSMENTS
In this section, we give a geometrical description of the set of consistent
assessments. To this purpose, we use some results derived in the previous
section.
Let G be an extensive form game and the sets A
q, X
q be ﬁxed. By
c qq . c  qq . Corollary 4.4 we know that either A A A , X is empty or A A A , X is
. q . qq . q the set of assessments s, b with A s s A , X b s X , and
n
i ? b
q b s n
i ? s
q s . .
for all i. If we take the exponential function on both sides and use the
q. q . i q . i q . deﬁnitions of b b and s s , the equation n ? b b s n ? s s is
equivalent to the equation
i nx i nx t c ? s a . .   b x . 
qq q c g C x g Xa g A l A x x g X x s . i i nn x x b rx . .  t c ? s a . . q   x g X qq c g C x g Xa g A l A r  x . r  x .
This equation can be written in the form
mi mi li li i xa x a b x ? s a s c ? b x ? s a 5.1 . . . .  .   
x g Xa g Ax g Xa g A
where c




i are nonnegative integers. xa x a
i  i . i .. . i  i. Let m be the vector m , m and l be the vector l , aa g Ax x g Xa a g A
 i .. . . m i
l .B y s,b we denote the expression xx g X
m i m i
ax s a ? b x . . . 
a g A x g X
. l i . We treat similarly s, b . Using this notation, Eq. 5.1 can be written in
the form
mi li i s , b s c ? s , b . .
and we obtain the following theorem.CONSISTENT ASSESSMENTS 251
qq c  qq . T HEOREM 5.1. For e¨ery pair A , X either A A , X is empty or
c qq . AA , X is determined by ﬁnitely many equations of the form
mi li i s , b s c ? s , b , . .
where m
i and l
i are nonnegati¨e integer ¨ectors.
n . n For a nonnegative vector ¨ g R , we denote by log ¨ the vector in R*
 obtained by taking the coordinatewise logarithm in ¨. Note that z sy ` i
. n . n if ¨ s 0. For a set S ; R of nonnegative vectors the set log S ; R*i s i
deﬁned in the obvious way.
. n 12 A set C ; R* is called a cone with ¨ertex if for every c , c g C and
12 . n every a, b ) 0 we have that ac q bc g C. We call a set C ; R*a
cone if there is a vector ¨ g R
n and a cone C9 with vertex 0 such that
C s¨ q C9.
A set L ; R
n is said to be a logarithmic cone if log L is a cone. Hence,
a logarithmic cone can be transformed into a cone by taking the coordi-
natewise logarithm.
THEOREM 5.2. The set of consistent assessments is the intersection of a
ﬁnite product of simplices with a ﬁnite number of logarithmic cones.
qq  qq . Proof. For a given pair A , X we denote by A A A , X the set of
. q . qq . q assessments s, b with A s s A and X b s X . By Theorem 5.1
c qq . we know that A A A , X is either empty or is equal to the set of
 qq . assessments in A A A , X which satisfy ﬁnitely many equations of the
form
mi li i s , b s c ? s , b .5 . 2 . .  .
c  qq . . Assume that A A A , X is not empty. For a nonnegative vector s, b of
q. q . the same size as an assessment we deﬁne A s and X b in the
 qq . obvious way. By LA, X we denote the set of nonnegative vectors
. q . qq . q s , b with A s s A , X b s X , and which satisﬁes the equations
. 5.2 .
. . qq Since the variables s a , b x with a f A , x f X do not appear in
 qq . these equations, the set LA, X can be written as
qq 4 LA, X sy ) 0 N Blog y s d = 0 4 .  .
for some appropriate matrix B and vector d. Here, 0 denotes the vector of
. 0 . 0 . zeroes corresponding to the restriction of s, b on A s = X b .I t
 qq . can be seen easily that LA, X is a logarithmic cone.PEREA Y MONSUWE, JANSEN, AND PETERS ￿ 252
If we denote the set of all assessments by A A, we obtain
c qq A A s A A l LA, X . . D
qq A , X
Since A A is a ﬁnite product of simplices, it follows that A A
c is the intersec-
tion of a ﬁnite product of simplices with a ﬁnite number of logarithmic
cones.
3 B
. In Blume and Zame 1994 it has been shown that the set of sequential
 equilibria is a semialgebraic set. A set is called semialgebraic if it is the
ﬁnite union of sets determined by a ﬁnite number of polynomial inequali-
. ties. These inequalities may be strict or non-strict. Using our insights
about consistent assessments, this result can be shown within a few lines.
 qq . Obviously, the sets LA, X in the proof of Theorem 5.2 are semial-
gebraic sets. Since A A is also semialgebraic, it follows that the set of
consistent assessments is semialgebraic. We already know that the set of
sequentially rational assessments is semialgebraic since sequential ratio-
nality is equivalent to a ﬁnite number of polynomial inequalities. Hence,
the set of sequential equilibria is the intersection of two semialgebraic sets
and is therefore semialgebraic itself.
COROLLARY 5.3. The set of sequential equilibria is a semialgebraic set.
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